

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
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HGG-A-1375

OCT 1 1954

Chief, WH

Chief of Station, Guatemala

PBHISTORY

Summary Report

Attached is PBHISTORY Summary Progress Report.

FTM/jpk

Francis T. Mylkes

Attachment: Summary Report

28 September 1954

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PBHISTORY Summary Report

I. Objectives - General

The primary goal of the PBHISTORY team was to exploit immediately the documents gathered by the Guatemalan Comité for intelligence and propaganda purposes. Also the PBHISTORY group was to initiate a records and files procedure for the Comité to serve as the basis for its new Intelligence Service.

II. Operations - General

- a. The PBHISTORY team reviewed more than 500,000 documents, not including several hundred thousand duplicate copies and illegible or semi-destroyed papers and masses of Communist propaganda, books, leaflets, and magazines. Of this material 2095 documents were considered to be of sufficient importance to warrant autostating; 50,000 more documents of secondary importance were microfilmed, and small numbers of original documents, most of them duplicates, were forwarded for technical study or as propaganda samples.
- b. KUGOWN - PBHISTORY, after initiating its analysis work, immediately began the KUGOWN exploitation of documents which would graphically implicate former leaders as Communists and expose the extent to which the Communists had controlled the ARBENZ Government. The principal channels through which these documents were released were the Comité leaders themselves, the Government Press Ministry, the local OKFLOWAGE officer, and KUGOWN outlets as arranged by Headquarters. During the entire project there was a steady stream of documents which found good play in the local press. (SEE Attachment "A.") International play is believed to be less - no clippings were made available to PBHISTORY. In addition to the use of documents themselves, a newsreel was made of the documents at the Comité Headquarters. This documentary short played in movie houses throughout the country to obviously responsive audiences. A two-man team armed with a good share of PBHISTORY documents was sent on a propaganda mission to principal countries of Latin America to show the end result of what Communism means - even in Latin America. Also special documents were taken to SKILLET for use in Honduras. For the complete details of the KUGOWN operations, see Attachment "B," prepared by LANGEVIN.

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- 2 -

- c. KUFIRE - During the PBHISTORY project, the Comité was unable to form an operational arm which was capable of exploiting the few leads which were developed by the documents. Therefore, for KUFIRE purposes no local exploitation by PBHISTORY was attempted. The Comité did instigate personal searches of the Communist asylees upon their departure from Guatemala, but little in the way of revealing documents was found although a goodly number of travel documents were picked up.

To assist the Comité in developing a working system for their future intelligence activities, PBHISTORY, in close collaboration with BANNISTER, who had previously offered guidance along these lines, developed an outline for the new intelligence service and prepared for the Comité an operations charter (See Attachments "C" and "D") to be presented to CALLIGERIS, who expressed an interest in having the Comité develop into a long-range organization.

- d. RI Work - The task of physically organizing the Comité documents was delegated to the RI members of the team, who within a short time had set up a system whereby the unsorted mountains of paper were given a preliminary sort, then analyzed, and, according to their importance, either destroyed or copied for PBHISTORY use and given to the Comité. After a two-week period a selected number of Guatemalans, supervised by PBHISTORY members, were capable of performing the preliminary sort, leaving the majority of the PBHISTORY team free for analysis and copying work. Once the analysis team swung into full work, it was necessary to call for a two-man microfilm team to photograph many valuable research documents. Once this sorting and analysis work was fully under way, considerable attention was given to the Comité archive section. Full instructions on how to card and file, carried out on a daily basis, were given. Close supervision was given to procedure detail to assure that the system would be retained after the departure of the majority of PBHISTORY personnel. In a special session PBHISTORY leaders were given a full briefing on archive procedure by [] For full RI details see [] report, Attachment "E."

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- 3 -

III. Results and Analysis

- a. General: The overall percentage of valuable documents was extremely low, resulting in a minimum of KUFIRE endeavors and limiting the KUGOWN efforts to primarily the Guatemalan audience. KUFIREwise, the developing of a new Guatemalan Intelligence Service, if followed up by KUBARK representatives, will undoubtedly give the Guatemalan station a valuable long-term asset.
- b. KUGOWN: The unusually cooperative press in Guatemala and the efforts of the Ministry of Propaganda, plus the aid of the local QKFLOWAGE man, enabled PBHISTORY to saturate fairly well the Guatemalans with the idea that the Comité had confirmed what had been denied by the pro-Communists - that the ARBENZ Government was dominated and controlled by Communists and that ARBENZ himself was finally completely identified with the Reds. Also the Comité was left with a mantle of respectability, as differing with the low talent reputation of the local police. Internationally the job was more difficult since few top secret documents were found, few stories were worthy of honest world news coverage.
- c. KUFIRE: Because of the vacillating political situation, the Comité was never given the full green light from CALLIGERIS to go ahead with their operations arm until the latter part of September. Although this had the serious disadvantage of not exploiting the departure of the asylees, it did have the advantage of not permitting a group of untrained, unrestricted officials from committing operational activities which would easily backfire and greatly depreciate the reputation of the Comité during its infancy of development. The Comité leaders are unusually receptive to suggestions made for their future organization, and it is imperative that KUBARK send a case officer with station cover to continue to press home the official constitution of the Comité and to give basic operational training to the intelligence officers. CALLIGERIS has already mentioned to MYLKES the possibility of sending a group of the Comité officials to Washington for training with ODENVY. Thus it behooves KUBARK to have a trained man available to forestall such a training program as envisaged by CALLIGERIS.

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- 4 -

- d. RI: Although the most basic system has been given and explained to the Comité for their records control, it will be necessary that at least one person be assigned to the Comité for at least the next 60-90 days to actually work in the archive section. The Comité leaders have already indicated their strong desire that such a person be assigned. The PBHISTORY chairman agrees with DADIGEN that, if no one is sent to supervise the file work during the next few months, all instruction to date may well be of no avail.
- e. Liaison: The liaison aspects of the PBHISTORY project were generally quite favorable. Relations with the Guatemalan Comité, both leaders and employees, were excellent. It should be noted that the members of the Documents Committee were notably successful in creating and maintaining correct and friendly relations. Without the working level's being in such close harmony, the Chairman could never have enjoyed such friendly relations with the leaders.

A successful working relationship was developed with the Minister of Propaganda, who proved helpful in distributing KUGOWN material to the local and international press.

With members of other Government agencies, it is to be noted that the ODACID members on the team were quite helpful and cooperative. Only a minimum of contact was made with ODACID officials in their local establishment, after the initial introduction and approval from JMBUG. In regard to the assistance from QKFLOWAGE, the local officer on many occasions proved a good source of support and advice on a number of KUGOWN matters.

BANNISTER and other station personnel were extremely cooperative and, aside from important administrative assistance, aided greatly in maintaining good relations with Comité leaders and other officials close to CALLIGERIS.

- f. HGG-A-1368 contains a report on the PBHISTORY material reviewed. All material autostated has been classified according to the nature of the documents.

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- 5 -

IV. Summary: Considering that PBHISTORY was the first of this organization's experience, other similar task forces in the future will undoubtedly have the benefit of going down a slightly more defined path. Primarily the real success of immediate KUGOWN-KUFIRE exploitation depended upon hot, Communist damaging documents. Few of these were found. A possible remedy in the future would be the formation of similar documents teams well before the finale of any similar PBSUCCESS. This preparation conceivably would assure more documents, which in this case the Communists had all the time in the world to take away or destroy. PBHISTORY has furnished a wealth of material from the ground-level Communist labor, youth and political groups, which should give researchers obvious answers as to the whys and hows of a Communist takeover, domination and downfall. For this task, PBHISTORY was able to fulfill the assignment to the fullest. The experience of three different agencies working in the field under one agency head proved to be quite practicable since the principle of joint cooperation as to mutual priorities of information was carefully worked out before the project's initiation.

The matter of cover was minimized by the fact that no Guatemalans were allowed into the interior of the working area of the Comité and special arrangements were made so that the majority of the team entered and departed via a rear entrance of the Comité only once a day.

Although the immediate results of PBHISTORY have proved far from sensational, the many local KUGOWN releases, the training of the Comité's personnel, the outlining of a permanent Guatemalan Intelligence Service, and the obtaining of large amounts of valuable research material are believed to have resulted in PBHISTORY's being a successful project.

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Attachment "B"

PBHISTORY

Final Summary of KUGOWN Activities

I. Objectives

The objectives of the KUGOWN program of PBHISTORY were threefold:

- a. To indicate to the people of Guatemala the extent of Communist penetration through the publication and dissemination of documents uncovered by the PBHISTORY team.
- b. To publicize the above internationally, and especially throughout Latin America.
- c. To create a position of importance in the country for the Comité Nacional de Defensa Contra el Comunismo, to imbue it with the proper prestige, to make it an authentic source of information on communist penetration in the Western Hemisphere, and to obviate possible detrimental criticism (that the Comité would grow into a small Gestapo, etc).

II. Operations

- a. The press was the principal media used to publicize, for the people of Guatemala, the extent to which Communist penetration had reached in the Republic. Photostatic copies of exploitable documents, sifted by members of the team, were sent to all newspapers. In some instances there were individual documents to be published with only a caption; in others, there were series of autostated papers on which editors could base a lengthy article.

The initial press release from the Comité explained its origin, its functions, and its objectives (see below). A series of photographs taken by the PBHISTORY team indicated the volume of documents and propaganda.

The method of release followed this general pattern: All members of the team sifting documents were instructed to pass all documents that might be exploitable to the KUGOWN officer. The acceptable documents were photostated or autostated. Appropriate captions or stories were written in English and translated into Spanish. The document was attached to a form press release sheet and addressed to the newspaper which seemed the most logical for the publication, or to all newspapers, if the document was of sufficient interest. The complete package was

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then sent by messenger to the proper newspaper office, or mailed directly. Other documents were prepared in the same manner and given to the Minister of Propaganda, to be handed out in a series of press conferences, or to be doled out to individual reporters from his office. All such documents, of course, were approved by the local members of the Comite prior to their release.

The second local method was through a short, documentary-style film produced by the Comite. This film was completely produced by the FBHISTORY EUGOVN officer. Six minutes in length, it contained appropriate titles, musical background and narration by the three announcers of "Radio Liberation". The basic cost of the film was met by the Comite, although the more expensive item of sufficient copies was taken care of by FBHISTORY.

The film, "Despues Descubrimos La Verdad" ("Later We Discover the Truth") was shown, and is still showing, in the theaters of Guatemala City, rotating from one theater to another so that all will sooner or later show it. Once it has made its round of the capital, it is scheduled to be sent to the provinces, so that eventually it will be shown in every theater in the Republic. One copy of the film was utilized by the Minister of Propaganda for private showings.

Radio, of course, was considered an unsuitable media for stories based on documentary evidence, and as a result, radio propaganda was limited to the "news" angle as repeated by commentators.

A display window in downtown Guatemala City was used to offer the public a display of Communist propaganda.

- b. International, especially Latin American coverage, was attempted through two press conferences of Guatemalan representatives of the various news services, the first when they were given a press release prepared by FBHISTORY, and the second, when they were given a series of the heretofore exclusive and important documents (For results, see below).

FBHISTORY released "Gray Book" documents in a manner that they could be properly revealed in the United States by Senator Kirsten. The Associated Press carried a story on his disclosures.

Individual releases, or individual "exclusive" documents, were prepared for visiting correspondents and local representatives of foreign newspapers.

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Through the cooperation of QKFLOWAGE, plastic matrixes of PBHISTORY photographs were made in Mexico. These were attached to a lengthy press release on the work of the Comite and the description of some of the documents uncovered. PBHISTORY prepared these, even to the point of addressing the individual air mail envelopes, and handed these over to the Minister of Propaganda to be sent to ninety principal newspapers throughout Latin America. Copies also went to Madrid, Rome, Paris, etc., and Spanish language newspapers in the United States. English versions were mailed to several important newspapers in the United States and in England.

PBHISTORY originated the project in the Ministry of Propaganda of sending a two-man team through Latin America to publicize the transistation. After considerable delay and political wrangling, the team left. They carried with them a copy of PBHISTORY film, and propaganda kits composed of photostatic copies of documents, examples of Soviet propaganda sent to Guatemala, and atrocity photographs.

PBHISTORY furnished the local propaganda authorities a constant supply of propaganda kits and document reproductions to be given out to visiting newspapermen and officials.

When Congressman Hillings visited this country, he was supplied with propaganda kits, photographs, and a special six-page "report" from the Comite outlining its activities and its viewpoints of Communist penetration, as learned from analysis of the documents.

PBHISTORY arranged with the Minister of Propaganda to extend invitations to newsmen from neighboring republics to visit Guatemala, and for a certain number to be sent from the country. PBHISTORY documentation was used to implement the reports of these newspapermen.

Local officers of QKFLOWAGE were provided with some fifty reproduced documents for immediate forwarding to their headquarters and ultimate use throughout the regular QKFLOWAGE channels to Latin America.

A copy of the PBHISTORY film was sent, along with the original negative, to QKFLOWAGE headquarters so that appropriate scenes could be immediately released to commercial newsreel companies servicing the latin market.

An NBC television cameraman was given the opportunity of filming the Comite's activity.

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- 4 -

In some instances the press releases sent to various countries contained an addendum prepared by PBHISTORY to make the story better for publication. For example, the regular release for Chile was augmented by a description of correspondence between Chilean and Guatemalan Communists.

PBHISTORY supplied as many appropriate documents as could be uncovered to SKIMMER for possible inclusion in a white paper.

Summaries of PBHISTORY releases printed locally were supplied to the QKFLOWAGE Latin American wire services.

III. Results and Analysis

- a. Results of the first KUGOWN objective ("to indicate to the people of Guatemala the extent of Communist penetration") were highly satisfactory. Press coverage was extensive. It was noted, however, that editors made little embellishment of even the most provocative documents, unless suggestions, captions or stories written by the KUGOWN officer went with the photostatic copy. When any document was accompanied by an explanatory story, the entire text was invariably used. All "general" photographs --- of the stacks of documents and propaganda, etc. --- were published.

The PBHISTORY film made a visible impression on viewers, and was applauded heavily by audiences.

There is no doubt that the people of Guatemala were informed satisfactorily as to the graphic and documentary proof uncovered by the Gomite.

- b. Results of the second objective ("to publicize internationally, especially in Latin America") were unsatisfactory. This was due to the fact that only one international news service (Reuters) carried the initial press release after it was given to them in a press conference by the Minister of Propaganda. They felt the story was not "spot" news, and consequently did not value it to the point of cable traffic.

Plans for PBHISTORY staged "raid" on Gomite headquarters by "Communists" trying to destroy the papers which would implicate them were abandoned when it was found that too many indigenous persons would have to be in the act. Such an operation would have undoubtedly hit the international cable services, but was too risky considering all factors.

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Coverage to Latin America on the USIS wire service, of course, was extensive. Anti-Communist declarations of Rodriguez Beteta¹ in Santiago, Chile, received nice play on the United Press circuit. Visiting newsmen included PBHISTORY angles in their stories to home newspapers. "Vision" magazine carried a story on the Comite, almost word for word as it was prepared for the correspondent by PBHISTORY through the Comite.

Several Guatemalan diplomats leaving for new Latin American posts were supplied with PBHISTORY propaganda kits, as well as groups of visiting editors from the USA. Results unknown.

Press releases accompanied by plastic matrixes were sent to newspapers throughout America, but it is not known at the moment of writing to what extent they were published. It is presumed that a good play was received.

The PBHISTORY commercial newsreel film shots have not yet appeared, but they are expected momentarily. The National Broadcasting Company used shots of PBHISTORY on its coast-to-coast facilities 14 August.

- c. Results of the third objective ("to create a position of importance for the Comite") were considered eminently satisfactory. In all releases it was stressed that the Comite not only was chasing Communists, but was also looking for the documentation that would reward valiant anti-Communists. It was also emphasized that the Comite was working on the record of Red penetration for the benefit of future threats in the Americas, etc.

There is no doubt that the Comite is now a well-known entity in Guatemalan life.

Summary: Three factors retarded KUGOWN action. (1) That less explosive documentation than was expected was found; (2) lack of an action arm and lack of dependability on indigenous persons belonging to the Comite; and (3) the fact that the Comite became a political football ----- members of the Comite were reluctant to aid GALLIGARIS too much, and GALLIGARIS was leery of the potential power of the Comite, and thus did not give it his full support.

¹PBHISTORY delegate.

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- 6 -

Even so, the general KUGOWN results of the project were satisfactory and undoubtedly worth the expenditure of funds and time spent.

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Attachment "C"

**Conceptos Básicos de Organización y Operación
para**

El Comité de Defensa Nacional Contra el Comunismo

El Comité será una organización de inteligencia completamente separada; cuya función principal es proteger al pueblo del Comunismo local e internacional y de elementos subversivos. El jefe de esta organización será responsable de sus actividades solo al presidente de la República. El Comité coordinará sus actividades muy de cerca con las de La Fuerza Armada G-2 y las de la Policía Secreta, para así tener beneficio completo de la información que esas organizaciones puedan desarrollar en el curso de sus actividades normales. Estas organizaciones de ahora en adelante cesarán cualquier operación de inteligencia contra el Comunismo, con excepción de un contra espionaje dentro de sus mismas filas. El Comité por su parte limitará sus actividades de inteligencia a cosas proveídas por los comunistas o grupos de similares. No reemplazará ni superpondrá su autoridad sobre la Policía Secreta o Las Fuerzas Armadas G-2; pero sí hará disponible a ellos informaciones acerca de las actividades comunistas descubiertas por este Comité y que sean de interés para los mismos.

El Comité en sus operaciones iniciales limitará sus actividades a Guatemala, y será organizado en zonas geográficas para facilitar dichas actividades. Sin embargo, se prevé la necesidad que el Comité en el futuro creará una sección internacional, especialmente interesada en personalidades Comunistas, eventos y movimientos que tienen implicaciones directas o alguna relación con las cercanas repúblicas de Centro América. Debido a la pequeñez de los países de Centro América y de las facilidades de movimientos de parte de los comunistas estas actividades internacionales del Comité son consideradas como esenciales.

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Dichas actividades principiaron cuando haya personal entrenado.

El Comité no asumirá la responsabilidad de hacer justicia a los comunistas, pero suministrará su evidencia a los tribunales de Justicia, donde decidirán la culpabilidad de los supuestos comunistas. El Comité recomendará, sin embargo, al Presidente que casos concernientes a los comunistas deberán tener leyes especiales para asegurar su pronta y legal resolución. Dar poderes al Comité con la autoridad de juzgar, sería violar su principio de solo ser un grupo de investigaciones y en corte plaza sería un objetivo de ataque, ya que no se prestaría a un régimen democrático.

El personal elegido por el Comité será minuciosamente examinado e investigado y cuando el tiempo lo permita entrenado profesionalmente para así formar un cuerpo de oficiales de suma responsabilidad con quien la ciudadanía Guatemalteca esté deseosa de cooperar y respetar.

Para evitar involucrimiento político, los fondos para los agentes y operaciones confidenciales del Comité necesariamente deberán venir de los presupuestos Confidenciales y Ejecutivos del Presidente. No así los gastos generales de empleados y mantenimiento que pasaron al presupuesto general de la nación. Sin embargo, una comisión especialmente escogida de tres hombres nombrados por el Presidente, serán los encargados de estudiar el presupuesto general del Comité al ser éste sometido anualmente. Aunque asuntos confidenciales y actividades del Comité no serán reveladas; cosas como salarios oficiales y gastos generales y sumas de operación serán debidamente examinados. Esta inspección hará mucho por eliminar crítica indevida al Comité por gastar fondos sin los controles comunmente puestos sobre todos los otros ministerios y agencias del gobierno.

De gran importancia es el hecho que el espíritu del Comité debe ser en todo tiempo apolítico. Debe esforzarse tan pronto como sea posible para obtener una categoría profesional y no rebajarse a ser un instrumento

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político usado para crear o mantener individuos inescrupulosos. Todos los intentos que personas y agrupaciones políticas hagan por interesar al Comité en actividades políticas serán reportados de inmediato al Ejecutivo para que se les apliquen las sanciones o amonestaciones del caso. Es fundamental por la misma existencia del Comité su apoliticidad reconocida por -- Los Jefes del Comité -- El Jefe Supremo -- y por todos los miembros del Gobierno y otros Líderes Políticos.

Para llenar su misión de proteger al pueblo de Guatemala del Comunismo y otras fuerzas subversivas, el Comité debe desarrollar tan rápidamente como sea posible sus recursos de información dentro de las que serán Organizaciones Campesinas, Sindicatos y Partidos Políticos. También se harán penetraciones en el sistema educativo y en todos los ministerios del Gobierno y agencias afiliadas a éste. Se harán también penetraciones en grandes compañías privadas importantes a la economía de la nación. Estos objetivos aunque son obviamente importantes, fueron esencialmente los mismos grupos que los Comunistas habían pervertido con mayor éxito y donde se puede contemplar que ellos tratarían de entrar de nuevo.

Para llevar a cabo estas penetraciones, el Comité organizará redes de agentes quienes por su profesión y origen estarán más apropiados para su asignación particular. También se tentará descubrir conocidos Comunistas o simpatizadores aquí o en el exilio.

Para llevar a cabo dichos programas, es obvio esperar que sin experiencia de parte de los mismos oficiales del Comité, la reclutación con éxito será un trabajo muy delicado y minucioso si se quiere hacer correctamente. La tendencia a reclutar rápidamente deberá ser suprimida. Y si el Comité después de un período de tiempo espera tener éxito en estas operaciones, deberá poner especial cuidado en la selección de sus oficiales, para poder exigir su

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eficiencia. El chequeo del origen y el entrenamiento rudimentario deberá tener lugar antes de que a un oficial del Comité le sea entregada la responsabilidad de a su vez reclutar agentes para el Comité. La pequeña del país hará demandas no usuales a los oficiales del Comité, quienes en muchos casos podrían ser objetivos de ridículo, dudas y ataque público. Sin embargo, el grado de inteligencia, preparación escolástica y coraje personal de los elegidos como oficiales del Comité convencerán efectivamente a la gente de Guatemala de la seriedad del trabajo del Comité. Ciertamente el propósito de su trabajo anti-comunista es vital más que cualquier otro trabajo público hecho por un oficial público en el país.

Como concebido el Comité será organizado en una manera clásica común a todas las buenas agencias extranjeras de inteligencia. El principio de las responsabilidades geográficas será claramente definida y los administradores centrales ayudarán a los encargados de las zonas geográficas. El mismo Comité quedará tan centralizado como sea posible para conservar el apoyo del personal y administración. Específicamente todas sus oficinas estarán en un edificio aunque sus oficiales sean asignados a departamentos fuera de la ciudad de Guatemala.

Como operación típica del caso la siguiente hipótesis de Historia puede ser un ejemplo: En Enero de 55 un candidato a las investigaciones oficiales del Comité es abordado por un oficial de dicho Comité. Después de 30-60 días de un chequeo completo, entrevistas, exámenes físicos y mentales y de lealtad, el candidato es aceptado. Durante los siguientes 60-90 días se le da entrenamiento básico. Durante el período, él es asignado (por el propósito de demostración) a la sección número uno de la División de la Ciudad de Guatemala. Su primer tarea es conseguir una penetración en un sindicato de profesores anteriormente dominado por los comunistas. Se le da dicha asignación porque anteriormente él mismo había sido maestro y está familiarizado con muchos de los individuos en

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el sindicato. El nuevo oficial con su entrenamiento y experiencia pasada, dentro de un corto período es capaz de hacer contacto con Fulano de Tal, una persona de conocida responsabilidad, que tiene la confianza de los antiguos profesores Comunistas que están secretamente en contacto con Rafael Tischler y quienes están ansiosos de crear de nuevo dominación Comunista en el sindicato de maestros ya con otro nombre.

A este punto en Junio de 1955 el oficial entrega por escrito su plan de operación a su agente superior que le aconseja y autoriza para hacer el trabajo, haciéndole ver el costo de la operación, el riesgo y el tiempo envuelto y los chances de buen éxito que tendrá. Si el plan es aprobado, el Oficial podrá proceder a reclutar a Fulano de Tal y principiar sus actividades de inteligencia. Al principio en Julio de 1955 las asignaciones serán pequeñas y sin mucha importancia -- de acuerdo con la experiencia del agente. Sin embargo, después de 3-6 meses el agente progresará hasta el punto donde ha adquirido la confianza de los comunistas y después de una serie de reportes aprobados, el Comité podrá hacer los arrestos apropiados en Diciembre de 1955 y pasar la información conseguida a las cortes especiales de prosecución Comunista. El agente mencionado es entonces asignado otro cargo, si no ha sido descubierto, o relevado de más trabajo y el Oficial es entonces obligado a reasignar o reclutar otro agente capaz de llenar el requisito requerido.

En el ejemplo anterior, el oficial de acuerdo con su plan de operaciones le será dado adecuado apoyo financiero, tendrá el uso de los archivos centrales, y en crecimiento del Comité para chequear nombres, podrá comprar equipo especial si es necesario, y podrá recibir consejo e instrucción de sus superiores referente a cualquier situación especial que pueda sobre venir.

Este método de operación, después de pasado un tiempo, se hace extremadamente efectivo y claramente sobre pasa el presente, inadecuado y


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antiguado método de policía ahora usados por las varias agencias Guatemaltecas encargadas de operaciones de inteligencia. La inmediata llave a este último recurso es tranquilidad política que permitirá llevar a cabo el consumo del tiempo para el entrenamiento de oficiales.


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Enlarged copies of Attachment "D"
were given to CALLIGERIS.




FONDOS CONFIDENCIALES EJECUTIVOS
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
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


OPERACIONES



RUTA DE DOCUMENTOS






OBSERVACION



INVESTIGACION




RECLUTAMIENTO


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
OFICIAL
NUEVO



TRABAJO
CONTRA
COMUNISMO

PASOS HACIA
UN NUEVO SISTEMA
DE INTELIGENCIA

ADMINISTRACION



~~Secret~~

Final Summary of RI Activities

Objectives

1. From a records viewpoint the objectives to be attained through PBHISTORY were threefold. The primary aim was to devise a procedure which would allow the expeditious sorting and reproduction of the large volume of confiscated material for PBHISTORY exploitation. The second phase of the activity was to establish a records system by means of which the Comité Nacional de Defensa Contra el Comunismo could process, house and utilize materials of interest and train the personnel to use that system.

Operations

2. The first aim was achieved by reviewing the material according to organizational source, and destroying illegible papers and those of which there were numerous extra copies. In addition to documents, the material included large quantities of books, pamphlets, posters, leaflets, etc. Within the organizational arrangement, the salvaged material was then divided into those logical patterns to which each group best lent itself. These patterns took the form of geographic, subjective and organizational arrangements. The material, which had been organized into some understandable form, was reviewed for PBHISTORY value.
3. Out of the numerous documents, 2095 documents determined to be of immediate value were autostated. Three autostat machines were in constant operation. One of these machines was borrowed from the local station. Maximum efficiency was not always obtained owing to delays in the procurement of proper paper and solution from Headquarters.
4. The material which was not determined to be of immediate interest was microfilmed. Approximately 50,000 microfilmed documents were forwarded to Headquarters. During a major portion of the time only one recordak was kept in operation. However, when the local political situation became doubtful, a second camera was borrowed from the Assistant Air Attache, and both of these machines were kept in full operation.
5. In addition to autostating and filming, some 750 positive projection prints were made for local and international newspaper exploitation. This was made possible through the use of the dark room facilities also made available to PBHISTORY personnel by the Assistant Air Attache.

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- 2 -

6. After reproduction, the original documents were forwarded to the central file unit which had been organized for the Comite. Here the documents were reviewed by local personnel, and those which were to be retained were classified according to a numerical system which had been drawn up for the use of the Comite. The documents were classified, indexed and carded. The main index, as of the fourth week of file room operation, contained approximately 16,000 reference cards. The file unit consists of analysis, numbering control, typing, filing and an index and a name check team. Thus phase two of the records objective was realized.
7. The third and final phase was not put into complete operation owing to the uncertain political and financial status of the Comite. A plan capable of housing future records and which will allow for expansion, was drawn up for the Comite's use by PBHISTORY (see Attachment "F"). A document flow chart showing control points was submitted by Headquarters' representative.

Results and Analysis

8. Although the personnel of the records unit contributed actively to phase two of the operation, their experience is not sufficiently extensive to successfully conduct the detailed functions of phase three. Headquarters is therefore advised strongly that additional guidance of a records nature be made available to the Comite in their future work.
9. Phase one was successfully terminated in that it provided Headquarters with a notable volume of information in a minimum of allowed time. The effects of phases two and three, although they give the appearance of a successful operation, cannot be accurately measured as time and experience will be necessary to establish a self-sufficient organization.

Attachment "E"

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Attachment "F"

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Archival

100 Administrative

- 100-1 Name Checks
- 100-2 Finances
- 100-3 Personnel
- 100-4 Logistics
- 100-5 Security

200 Personalities

300 International

1-6 Central American Countries

400 Ciudad de Guatemala

500 Area "A"

- 500-1 Dept. of ----
- 500-2 Dept. of ----
- 500-3 Dept. of ----
- 500-12 Dept. of ----

600 Area "B"

- 600-1 Dept. of ----
- 600-2 Dept. of ----
- 600-3 Dept. of ----
- 600-11 Dept. of ----

7 September 1954

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Release Sent Out by Guatemalan Ministry of Propaganda

On 31 August, the Guatemalan Ministry of Propaganda airmailed press releases and photo matrices of documents and evidences of Communist activities of the former regime to 90 principal newspapers in the Western Hemisphere and in Europe.

The Social Research Group was instrumental in selecting and assisting in the preparation of this material.

Distribution:

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Note: Based of GUAT 217 (IN 41191)

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